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Abstract
We present simple one-shot distribution experiments comparing the relative im-
portance of eﬃciency, maximin preferences and inequality aversion, as well as
the relative performance of the fairness theories by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). While the Fehr and Schmidt model performs
better in a direct comparison, this appears to be due to being in line with max-
imin preferences. More importantly, we ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of both eﬃciency
and maximin preferences is stronger than that of inequality aversion. We dis-
cuss potential implications our results might have for the interpretation of other
experiments.
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11 Introduction
Among the recent attempts to explain anomalous behavior observed in economic ex-
periments, models based on inequality aversion have received special attention. The
attractiveness of these models is based on their ability to rationalize a number of well
known anomalies with just two motives, maximization of own payoﬀ and inequality
aversion. The latter is understood as disutility arising from diﬀerences between the
own payoﬀ and others’ payoﬀs.
The aim of this paper is on the one hand to compare the relative importance of
inequality aversion, concerns for eﬃciency and maximin preferences in simple distri-
bution experiments. On the other hand, we compare the relative performance of two
similar theories based on inequality aversion: Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) “Theory
of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition” (henceforth ERC) and Fehr and Schmidt’s
(1999) “Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation” (henceforth F&S).
Our original approach to compare ERC and F&S recognized the potential impor-
tance of eﬃciency1 and thus controlled for it. However, we expected this to be a
comparably minor eﬀect. It turned out, that this was not the case (see the analysis
of treatments F and E in section 4). This ﬁnding inspired further experiments to test
for the robustness of this result and to investigate to what extent inequality aversion
is dominated by eﬃciency concerns or maximin preferences, which are understood as
a desire to maximize the minimal payoﬀ in the group. In particular, these new treat-
ments allow us to compare the explanatory power of the models based on inequality
aversion to the model by Charness and Rabin (forthcoming, henceforth C&R), that is
based on eﬃciency concerns and maximin preferences and was inspired by results in
similar experiments.
Our results suggest that eﬃciency concerns and maximin preferences are important
in this class of simple distribution experiments. While this does not necessarily imply
that they are equally important in other classes of games, common interpretations of
several games may well be confounded by these motives. It appears that this may have
been given too little attention in the past (see section 6 for a discussion). To illustrate
that ignoring eﬃciency and maximin preferences may be problematic, consider the







1Eﬃciency is here simply understood as the sum of payoﬀs, not in the sense of Pareto-eﬃciency.
2If person 2 is inequality averse, i.e. dislikes diﬀerences between the payoﬀso ft h et h r e e
subjects, she clearly prefers B over A. But B is also the preferred choice for person 2
if she is driven by eﬃciency concerns, i.e. a desire to maximize the total payoﬀ of all
subjects or by maximin preferences, i.e. a desire to maximize the minimal payoﬀ of all
subjects. Thus deriving any conclusions from a choice of B concerning the importance
of inequality aversion is confounded by eﬃciency concerns and maximin preferences.
One cannot tell whether person 2 wants to redistribute money from the rich to the poor
because she dislikes inequality, because she cares for eﬃciency, or because she cares
particularly for the poorest. Now add a third allocation C, so that person 2 chooses
from the following allocations.
Allocation ABC
Person 1 98 1 1
Person 2 88 1 0
Person 3 489
Total 21 24 30
If person 2 chooses allocation B now, this is a clear indication that she is inequality
averse, since she is even giving up own payoﬀ to reduce inequality and both eﬃciency
concerns and maximin preferences suggest a choice of C. The latter, in turn, could not
be considered evidence for either eﬃciency concerns or maximin preferences, since the
same result is suggested by pure selﬁshness.
In our experiments, we disentangle eﬃciency concerns, maximin preferences and
inequality aversion to compare their relative importance. In order to exclude, as far as
possible, motives like reciprocity, we chose degenerate games like the one above that
were completely reduced to the question of distribution. All a subject had to do was to
choose one of three allocations of money between herself and two other subjects. Since
both ERC and F&S are formulated on the basis of distributions only, these games seem
to us the most neutral playground to compare their predictive accuracy.
In contrast to previous experiments, in several of our treatments ERC and F&S
predict choices of allocations that are at the opposite ends of the choice set. In these
treatments, F&S does better in general. However, this eﬀect appears to result from
F&S being in line with maximin preferences in this situation. When F&S predicts
an allocation that is Pareto-dominated, it does very poorly. Across all treatments, a
conditional logistic regression reveals that both eﬃciency and maximin preferences are
indispensable for a complete explanation of our results, whereas inequality aversion
does not signiﬁcantly add to the explanation.
Other fairness theories could be applied to our setting as well. Our experiments,
however, are not suited to test theories that explicitly take intentions into account (e.g.
Rabin, 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2000, Falk and Fischbacher, 1999) since this
would require assumptions about beliefs concerning the choices of subjects with whom
3one might be matched. The same holds for the full C&R model but we can shed
some light on the basic model, relying on selﬁshness plus quasi-maximin preferences
(maximizing a weighted sum of total and minimal payoﬀ).
In section 2 we outline the diﬀerence between ERC and F&S that we focus on
in the comparison. Section 3 presents our experimental procedures, followed by the
experimental results in sections 4 and 5 as well as a discussion in section 6. Section 7
concludes.
2 I n e q u a l i t yM e a s u r e si nE R Ca n dF & S
The diﬀerence between the inequality measures in ERC and F&S is represented in the
motivation or utility function. The motivation function of ERC is given by vi(yi,σi),
with yi denoting the own payoﬀ and σi the share of the total payoﬀ,a n dvi for given
yi being maximal if σi = 1
n, n being the number of players. F&S assumes a utility








j6=i max{xi − xj,0} with
αi ≥ βi ≥ 0, βi < 1 and xi the payoﬀ of subject i.
Hence ERC assumes that subjects like the average payoﬀ to be as close as possible
to their own payoﬀ while F&S assumes that subjects dislike a payoﬀ diﬀerence to any
other individual. According to ERC, therefore a subject would be equally happy if all
subjects received the same payoﬀ or if some were rich and some were poor as long as
she received the average payoﬀ, while according to F&S she would clearly prefer that
all subjects get the same. In a real life situation F&S predicts that the middle class
would tax the upper class to subsidize the poor, while in an ERC world the middle class
would be content with the distribution. Our taxation games mimic such a situation.
3 Experimental Procedures
We conducted thirteen experimental treatments in three sessions. These sessions were
all conducted as classroom experiments at the end of a lecture during the ﬁrst weeks of
introductory economics courses at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 136 participants
took part in the ﬁrst session in 1998, 68 in both treatments E and F. 240 participants
took part in the second session in 2000, 30 for each of the next eight treatments. In the
third session in 2001, 210 participants took part, 90 in both treatments Ex* and P*, and
30 in treatment Ey. We had determined a number of seats corresponding to the desired
number of participants in advance. We asked students to either take one of these seats
or to leave the class room. After all seats had been taken and all other students had
left the classroom, each participant received a decision sheet with the instructions and
a questionnaire. We used the questionnaires to gather some biographical data and to
check whether the participants understood the task completely. The total procedure
4took about 20 minutes. Participants were paid in class the following week. They
were identiﬁed by codes that were noted both on the decision sheets and on attached
identiﬁcation sheets that the participants kept. They received the payment in a sealed
envelope in exchange for the identiﬁcation sheet. These procedures implied anonymity
with respect to the other participants.
The decision sheet contained three diﬀerent allocations of money between three
persons, of which they had to choose one. They were informed that we would randomly
form groups of three later on and would also assign the three roles randomly, hence
subjects faced role uncertainty. Only the choice of the participant selected as person
2 mattered.2 Treatments Ex* and P*, that serve as control treatments for possible
inﬂuences of the role uncertainty, assigned ﬁxed roles in advance, but kept the random
ex-post formation of groups. To avoid inﬂuence by computation errors we also noted the
average payoﬀs of persons 1 and 3 and the total payoﬀ f o re a c ha l l o c a t i o ni nt h ed e c i s i o n
sheet.3 Sample instructions can be found in appendix A. The precise allocations and
the resulting predictions of the diﬀerent theories will be presented along with the results




In line with our motivation that according to F&S the middle-class would like to tax
the upper class to subsidize the poor, while it would be content with the distribution
according to ERC, we call one class of our experimental games taxation games. In
these games the decision maker (person 2) receives an intermediate payoﬀ and can
redistribute payoﬀ between person 1, who receives a higher payoﬀ, and person 3, who
receives a lower payoﬀ. These are our original treatments F and E as well as treatments
2In other words, we used (a reduced form of) the strategy method. Apart from generating three
times the data, it secured that all participants were considered to be equally entitled to the money
since they had all performed the same task. It also prevented that we had to pay participants for doing
nothing. Careful readers might have noticed that it is impossible to divide 68 subjects into groups of
3 in treatments E and F. We used one subject per treatment a second time as a dummy subject to
ﬁll a group, without paying twice. Hence the decision of two of our subjects either mattered for two
groups (if the dummy subject was person 2) or mattered only for one other person (if the dummy was
not person 2). We chose this procedure since in recruiting the subjects in the classroom, we focused
on having equal subtreatments sizes, i.e. multiples of four. This slight dishonesty was avoided in the
other treatments since keeping the same number of subjects for each of the six subtreatments per
treatment implied multiples of three for each main treatment.
3Noting the average payoﬀ implies that ERC was getting a pretty fair shot, since it made the
allocation that is optimal according to ERC easy to recognize.
5Fx and Ex. Their crucial property is, that the allocation that minimizes the diﬀerence
between the payoﬀs of person 2 and each of the other persons, maximizes the diﬀerence
between the payoﬀ of person 2 and the average payoﬀ and vice versa. Thus ERC and
F&S predict choices of opposite allocations. Since both theories include self-interest, we
kept the payoﬀ of person 2 constant over all allocations to insure disjoint predictions.
Compared to treatments F and E, in Fx and Ex the relative payoﬀ of person 2 diﬀers
much more between the allocations and is exactly
1
3 in the ERC prediction to make
the deviations from the optimum according to ERC more salient. The allocations for
treatments F, E, Fx and Ex are presented in Table 1 along with the average payoﬀ of
persons 1 and 3, the relative payoﬀ of person 2, and the total payoﬀ.W ea l s om a r k e d
which allocation is predicted by ERC and F&S and which allocation maximizes the
minimal or the total payoﬀ, as well as the actual choices.
Our treatments diﬀered by the eﬀect the choice of an allocation had on the total
payoﬀ.I nt r e a t m e n t sFa n dF xt h ea l l o c a t i o np r e d i c t e db yF & Sm a x i m i z e st h et o t a l
payoﬀ (and that is why they are called treatments F and Fx). In treatments E and Ex
the choice predicted by ERC maximizes total payoﬀ. Thus, in the treatments taken
together, we have controlled for a possible eﬀect of concerns for eﬃciency in favor of
any of the two theories.4 Neither ERC, nor F&S, eﬃciency or maximin preferences
predict that the intermediate allocation will ever be chosen.
In all taxation games the F&S prediction coincides with the maximin allocation.
Thus one might object, that we should have controlled not only for the eﬀect of eﬃ-
ciency, but also for the inﬂuence of maximin preferences. While both F&S and ERC
can, however, equally well be in line with and contrary to eﬃciency, the same holds only
for ERC with respect to maximin preferences. F&S is contrary to maximin preferences
only if increasing the diﬀerence to the poorest payoﬀ is the price for a reduction of
other payoﬀ diﬀerences that are larger or disadvantageous (as is the case in our other
treatments). Thus it is an inherent diﬀerence of the two models and not an artifact of
our design that F&S is rather in line with maximin preferences.
Each of the treatments E and F was also divided into two subtreatments that only
diﬀered by the order in which the allocations were presented on the decision sheet.5
All other treatments were divided into six subtreatments, one for each permutation of
the allocations.
4The preferable way to prevent results being confounded by eﬃciency would have been that all
allocations yielded the same total payoﬀ. If the own payoﬀ is ﬁxed, however, ERC implies indiﬀerence
between all allocations if the average and thus the total payoﬀ of the other subjects is the same.
5This was done to avoid the conceivable inﬂuence of a preference for the center or right allocation.
The allocation with intermediate payoﬀs was always presented on the left, since it was the allocation we
were not really interested in and thus did not consider it a problem that it might have been advantaged
or disadvantaged by the position. Our later approach to use all six permutations is certainly superior.
6Treatment F E Fx Ex
Allocation ABCABCABCABC
Person 1 8.2 8.8 9.4 9.4 8.4 7.4 17 18 19 21 17 13
Person 2 5.6 5.6 5.6 6.4 6.4 6.4 10 10 10 12 12 12
Person 3 4.6 3.6 2.6 2.6 3.2 3.8 951345
Total 18.4 18 17.6 18.4 18 17.6 36 33 30 36 33 30
Average 1, 3 6.4 6.2 6 6 5.8 5.6 13 11.5 10 12 10.5 9
Relative 2 .304 .311 .318 .348 .356 .364 .278 .303 .333 .333 .364 .4
Eﬃcient A A A A
ERC pred. C A C A
F&S pred. A C A C
Maximin A C A C
Choices (abs.) 57 7 4 27 16 25 26 2 2 1 251 3
Choices (%) 83.8 10.3 5.9 39.7 23.5 36.7 86.7 6.7 6.7 40 16.7 43.3
Choices (sub.1) 29 3 2 14 8 12
Choices (sub.2) 28 4 2 13 8 13
Table 1: Allocations (in DM), predictions by ERC and F&S, maximin and eﬃcient
allocations, and decisions for the taxation games
Results
The results for treatments E and F (including the subtreatments in the last two
rows) as well as for Fx and Ex are presented in Table 1. In both treatments F and E
there is virtually no diﬀerence between the two subtreatments (χ2
2 = .08,p>. 96 for
treatment E and χ2
2 = .16,p>. 92 for treatment F).6 While there is certainly some
randomness in our data due to the random allocation of subjects to treatments, the
virtual absence of diﬀerences between the subtreatments suggests that our data are far
from being completely random.
The results for treatment F are very clear. 83.8% of subjects chose the allocation
leading to a maximization of utility according to F&S and also to a maximization of
total payoﬀ. On the other hand, only 5.9% chose the allocation predicted by ERC, and
10.3% the intermediate allocation. The three allocations were not chosen with equal
probability (pABC <. 001), in particular the F&S allocation was chosen signiﬁcantly
m o r eo f t e nt h a nt h eE R Ca l l o c a t i o n( pAC <. 001).7
6H e n c ew ec a nc o n c l u d et h a tt h er e s u l t sa r en o td r i v e nb yap r e f e r e n c ef o re i t h e rt h em i d d l eo rt h e
right column and we pool the data from the respective subtreatments. For the other treatments we
do not report results for the subtreatments, since the number of subjects in each of the subtreatments
was only ﬁve, and since we completely controlled for possible preferences for certain positions by using
all permutations of the allocations.
7In the following pABC will always denote the level of signiﬁcance for a multinomial test of the
hypothesis that all allocations are chosen with the same probability, whereas pXY will denote the level
of signiﬁcance for a (two-sided) binomial test of the hypothesis that allocations X and Y are chosen
with the same probability taking the number of choices for the third allocation as given.
7For treatment E the results are more dispersed. While 39.7% of subjects chose the
allocation predicted by ERC (and eﬃciency), 36.7% decided according to the prediction
by F&S and maximin preferences, while 23.5% chose the intermediate allocation.8
The hypothesis that all three allocations were chosen with equal probability cannot
be rejected (pABC >. 2). Speciﬁcally, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
probabilities with which the two extreme allocations were chosen.
Since the two treatments balance the inﬂuence of eﬃciency concerns, we also study
the pooled data. There, 60.2% of subjects chose the allocation predicted by F&S,
whereas 22.8% d e c i d e di nl i n ew i t hE R Ca n d16.9% chose the intermediate allocation
(pABC <. 001, pF&S,ERC <. 001).
Of the 136 choices in both treatments, 61.8% a r ei nl i n ew i t ht h em a x i m i z a t i o n
of total payoﬀsw h i l e21.3% minimize it. A binomial test shows that this diﬀerence
is signiﬁcant (p<. 001). Hence contradicting the assumption made by both ERC
and F&S that eﬃciency does not matter we ﬁnd a clear inﬂuence. Furthermore, the
distribution of decisions clearly diﬀers between treatments E and F (χ2
2 =2 9 .44,p<
.001). Since the crucial diﬀerence between E and F is the role of eﬃciency, we see this
as substantial evidence that eﬃciency matters.
The results for treatments Fx and Ex almost exactly match the results of treatments
F and E. In treatment Fx 86.7% decided according to the F&S prediction and 6.7%
both for the ERC prediction and the intermediate allocation. Again all allocations
were not chosen with the same probability (pABC <. 001) and the F&S allocation was
chosen signiﬁcantly more often than the ERC allocation (pAC <. 001). In treatment
Ex the F&S prediction has a marginal advantage over the ERC allocation (43.3% vs.
40%), with a non-negligible fraction of 16.7% deciding for the intermediate allocation.
The diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant (pABC >. 133,p AC =1 ). In both treatments pooled
signiﬁcantly more subjects chose the F&S allocation than the ERC allocation (p<
.001) and signiﬁcantly more subjects maximized than minimized eﬃciency (p<. 003).
Again, the distribution of choices diﬀers signiﬁcantly between treatments Ex and Fx
(χ2
2 =1 4 .51,p<. 001).
In treatments Fx and Ex the diﬀerence between the relative share of person 2 and
the optimum according to ERC is much more salient than in treatments F and E.
Since the results changed only marginally (and not in favor of ERC, distributions are
far from signiﬁcantly diﬀerent: χ2
2 = .69,p>. 7 for Ex vs. E and χ2
2 = .34,p>. 84 for
Fx vs. F), we conclude that the poor performance of ERC in our original treatments
cannot be attributed to non-salient diﬀerences in relative payoﬀs. Arguably, these are
still not huge, but if non-salience was the issue, than the performance of ERC should
improve at least somewhat compared to E and F.
8The explanation that some of these subjects provided in the questionnaires indicates that they
were looking for a compromise between eﬃciency and fairness.
8Explaining their decisions in treatments E and F, 18 subjects explicitly referred to
fairness. Of these 18 subjects, 17 chose according to F&S, including 8 subjects who also
referred to the maximal total payoﬀ. The remaining subject chose the intermediate
allocation. Of 12 subjects who stated the reason for their decisions was maximization of
total payoﬀ (without explicit reference to fairness), 8 were in treatment F and thus chose
the allocation predicted by F&S, the other 4 in treatment E chose according to ERC.
Only one subject referred to relative payoﬀs in the explanation, but contrary to ERC,
this subject stated that he wanted to maximize his own share. In treatments Ex and Fx
all 15 subjects who explicitly referred to fairness chose the F&S allocation. Eﬃciency
concerns were mentioned by 16 subjects, and 6 indicated maximin preferences. Thus
among the subjects who explicitly mentioned fairness as a motivation, F&S did much
better than ERC and a substantial part of subjects explicitly stated eﬃciency concerns.
Thus we conclude for the taxation games, that F&S outperforms ERC and that
eﬃciency clearly inﬂuences choices. Since the F&S prediction is always the maximin
allocation, a substantial part of the data are consistent with maximin preferences.
Furthermore, since most of the choices which are not in line with maximin preferences
are eﬃcient (the ERC allocation in treatments E and Ex), quasi-maximin preferences
(i.e. maximization of a weighted sum of the total and the minimal payoﬀ as in C&R)
are consistent with about 85% of the data, if one allows for heterogeneity of subjects.
However, this may not be too surprising, given that quasi-maximin preferences are
consistent with both extreme allocations in treatments E and Ex.
4.2 Envy Games
Details and Predictions
Treatments F and E demonstrated a major inﬂuence of eﬃciency. This inspired us to
subject both theories of inequality aversion to a more severe test, in which they predict
decisions that are Pareto-dominated. This situation is represented by treatment N,
where the payoﬀ to person 2 is again intermediate and kept constant. In this treatment
F&S predicts a choice of C, which is Pareto-dominated by the ERC prediction B, which
is in turn Pareto-dominated by allocation A (see Table 2 which is structured in the
same way as Table 1). We call these games envy games, because envy could lead the
middle-class to take money from the poor, only to be able to take more from the rich.9
We also used this treatment as a baseline to test the robustness of our results with
9We do not claim that the motivation that leads subjects to behave in that way is in fact envy,
which corresponds to the α-component of F&S. It only seems a likely inﬂuence in this class of games.
Hence our choice of name. Another possible motivation would be competitiveness or spite, i.e. a desire
to lower all other subjects’ payoﬀs relative to the own payoﬀ, which corresponds to the α-component
of F&S plus the inverse of the β-component. Levine (1998) presents a fairness theory that explicitly
takes spite into account.
9Treatment N Nx Ny Nyi
Allocation ABCABCAB C ABC
Person 1 16 13 10 16 13 10 16 13 10 16 13 10
Person 2 88898778 9 7.5 8 8.5
Person 3 53153153 1 531
Total 29 24 19 30 24 18 28 24 20 28.5 24 19.5
Average 1, 3 10.5 8 5.5 10.5 8 5.5 10.5 8 5.5 10.5 8 5.5
Relative 2 .276 .333 .421 .3 .333 .389 .25 .333 .45 .263 .333 .436
Eﬃcient A A A A
ERC pred. B Ao r B Bo r C Bo r C
F&S pred. C Ao rC C C
Maximin A A A A
Choices (abs.) 21 8 1 25 4 1 23 4 3 18 5 7
Choices (%) 70 26.7 3.3 83.3 13.3 3.3 76.7 13.3 10 60 16.7 23.3
Table 2: Allocations (in DM), predictions by ERC and F&S, maximin and eﬃcient
allocations, and decisions for the envy games
regard to the monetary incentives for person 2. To test whether subjects were willing
to give up own payoﬀ for their desire to increase eﬃciency or to reduce inequality,
we let the payoﬀ of person 2 vary across allocations in the treatments Nx, Ny, and
Nyi (see Table 2). Since both F&S and ERC also take maximization of own payoﬀ
into account, their predictions depend on the weight assigned to selﬁshness relative to
inequality aversion. In treatment Nx, ERCpredicts achoice of A(which strictly Pareto-
dominates B and C) or B, whereas F&S predicts a choice of A or C. In treatments Ny
and Nyi ERC predicts a choice of B or C, whereas F&S predicts a choice of C, while A
is eﬃcient (though no longer Pareto-dominant). We do not intend to measure precisely
the value subjects attach to either eﬃciency or equality with these treatments. The
primary purpose is to test whether our results in the other treatments might be artifacts
of the irrelevance of the choice for the own payoﬀ.
Results
In treatment N, 70% chose the Pareto-eﬃcient allocation (which is consistent with
quasi-maximin preferences), 26.7% the ERC allocation and only 3.3% the F&S al-
location (pABC <. 001). Hence ERC clearly outperforms F&S, but with the aid of
Pareto-dominance (pBC <. 04).10
In treatment Nx we added 1 DM for person 2 in allocation A and subtracted 1
DM in allocation C. As expected, this increased the number of choices for the Pareto-
dominant allocation A (83.3%) and decreased that for allocation B (13.3%), with again
10Fehr and Schmidt (1999) do not claim that all subjects are inequality averse, but only a substantial
fraction. (On the basis of ultimatum games they estimate this fraction to be about 70%.) One out of
30, however, is hardly a substantial fraction.
103.3% for allocation C (pABC <. 001,p BC >. 3). In treatment Ny (Nyi), we subtracted 1
DM (.5 DM) in allocation A and added 1 DM (.5 DM) in allocation C. As expected, this
increased the number of choices of allocation C somewhat, to 10% (23.3%). However,
with 76.7% (60%), again the majority chose allocation A, whereas also the choices for
allocation B are reduced to 13.3% (16.7%) (Ny: pABC <. 001,p AB <. 001,p AC <. 001,
Nyi: pABC <. 011,p AB <. 011,p AC <. 044). Thus the results in these treatments are
qualitatively well in line with the constant-own-payoﬀ treatment N with deviations as
expected by standard economic theory overall.11 This result suggests that our results
in the other treatments are not plain artifacts of the constancy of the decision maker’s
payoﬀ.O v e r a l l t h e r e i s a n e ﬀect of small variations in the own payoﬀ (and in an
expected way) but it is minor.12 Hence the relative importance of the diﬀerent motives
does not seem to change fundamentally if concerns for the own payoﬀ become an issue.
In contrast, the own payoﬀ seems to be just another factor of non-negligible but non-
dominating importance.
Note that Ny and Nyi are the only treatments where F&S makes a unique prediction
(C) for all subjects, including those which are not inequality averse, since the own
payoﬀ is maximal and inequality minimal. But this prediction only covers one sixth of
d e c i s i o n si nb o t ht r e a t m e n t s( pAC <. 001 for Ny and Nyi aggregated).
We conclude for the envy games that F&S performs poorly in the face of Pareto-
dominance and that ERC does somewhat better but not well, whereas the basic C&R
model does very well. In addition the envy games provide an example that the pre-
dictive power of F&S can in some cases substantially be improved by abstracting from
the linear form. For example, if the disutility is assumed to be quadratic in inequality
instead of linear, F&S could also explain choices of allocation B. Of course, this comes
at some cost (e.g. not being neutral to scaling), but they might be outweighed by the
beneﬁts. In addition, if the restriction β ≤ α is relaxed, then F&S can be consistent
with choices of A. Hence the results in the envy games cannot be seen as evidence
against inequality aversion in any possible form.
The envy games emphasize the importance of eﬃciency if it comes in the strong
form of Pareto-dominance. Even then, however, it does not capture all choices and
thus there is a potential role for other motives like inequality aversion (in particular of
11The eﬀect should be larger in treatment Ny than in Nyi and the number of choices for A should
not increase in Ny. These deviations, however, can be attributed to randomness in the data, that
naturally follows from the random allocation of the subjects to the treatments. No pair of distributions
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 5% level (N vs. Nx: χ2
2 =1 .68,p>. 43, Nv s .N y :χ2
2 =2 .42,p>. 29,
Nv s .N y i :χ2
2 =5 .42,p>. 06, Ny vs. Nyi: χ2
2 =2 .32,p>. 31, Nx vs. Ny: χ2
2 =1 .08,p>. 58, Nx vs.
Nyi: χ2
2 =5 .75,p>. 05, N vs. Ny and Nyi pooled: χ2
2 =4 .36,p>. 11.)
12Note that in Ny 76.7% of subjects give up 22% of their own payoﬀ, apparently to satisfy quasi-
maximin preferences. While this share corresponds to only a relatively small absolute amount of
money, it is often considered strong evidence against self-interest if subjects are willing to give up 20
or 25% of their payoﬀ to achieve, for example, equality.
11the ERC kind).13 Maximin preferences are in line with eﬃciency, so the results provide
(weak) support for their importance.
In the questionnaires references to (Pareto-) eﬃciency are more prominent in treat-
ment Nx (21 subjects) than in N (11) or Ny and Nyi (15 in total). In all envy games
together fewer subjects mention fairness (7) than maximin preferences (11) and self-
ishness (13). One subject states preferences in line with ERC.
4.3 Rich and Poor Games
Details and Predictions
In the preceding eight treatments person 2 always obtained an intermediate payoﬀ.
Our treatments R and P study situations where the decision maker receives either
the highest payoﬀ (i.e. is “rich”, treatment R, hence “rich game”) or the lowest payoﬀ
(i.e. is “poor”, treatment P, hence “poor game”), which is again constant (see Table 3).
Since F&S aggregates over all persons richer or poorer than oneself, it predicts the same
as ERC in these situations. So these treatments do not allow to distinguish between
F&S and ERC. They allow, however, to contrast eﬃciency, maximin preferences and
inequality aversion and in particular more general forms of inequality aversion. In
treatment R person 2 receives the highest payoﬀ and can choose for the other subjects
payoﬀs that are relatively equal (C) or that are maximal in sum (A). Both F&S and
ERC predict a choice of the eﬃcient allocation A, whereas maximin preferences predict
C. In contrast, in treatment P person 2 receives the lowest payoﬀ.I n e q u a l i t ya v e r s i o n
predicts a choice of the least eﬃcient allocation C. The important aspect of treatment P
is that the minimal payoﬀ is constant, so that maximin preferences cannot inﬂuence the
results. Hence this treatment allows us to contrast eﬃciency and inequality aversion
in a frame neutral to maximin preferences.
We also study at this point our last treatment Ey. This treatment is identical
to Ex except that the allocator’s payoﬀ is 9 instead of 12. Although Ey has the
basic structure of the taxation games (the allocator with an intermediate payoﬀ can
increase the poorest subject’s payoﬀ at the expense of the richest or vice versa), it
does not share the crucial property of the taxation games that allowed a comparison of
F&S and ERC. Since the allocator’s payoﬀ i sl o w e rt h a ni nE x ,t h ep r e f e r r e do u t c o m e
according to ERC is shifted from A to C. Not only ERC and F&S, but also maximin and
hence all fairness motives under consideration predict the choice of the least eﬃcient
13As was suggested by a referee, our results in treatment N do not necessarily imply that 30% of
subjects are inequality averse rather than motivated by eﬃciency or maximin. The pattern of observed
proportions declining with the eﬃciency and maximin rank of the allocations well ﬁts a random utility
version of quasi-maximin preferences. Error rates nearly this high have been estimated from retest
reliabilities in two-alternative lottery choice tasks (see e.g. Ballinger and Wilcox, 1997) and in our
treatments the error rates might be higher since they involve the choice among three alternatives.
12Treatment R P Ey
Allocation ABCABCABC
Person 1 11 8 5 14 11 8 21 17 13
Person 2 12 12 12 444999
Person 3 234567345
Total 25 23 21 23 21 19 33 30 27
Average 1, 3 6.5 5.5 4.5 9.5 8.5 7.5 12 10.5 9
Relative 2 .48 .522 .571 .174 .19 .211 .273 .3 .333
Eﬃcient A A A
ERC pred. A C C
F&S pred. A C C
Maximin C A B or C C
Choices (abs.) 86 1 6 18 2 10 12 7 11
Choices (%) 26.7 20 53.3 60 6.7 33.3 40 23.3 36.7
Table 3: Allocations (in DM), predictions by ERC and F&S, maximin and eﬃcient
allocations, and decisions for the rich and poor games, as well as for treatment Ey
allocation. Therefore, this treatment serves the same purpose as the poor game, namely
the comparison of eﬃciency concerns and fairness motives.
Results
At a ﬁrst glance, the results in treatments R and P may appear as a puzzle. The
results in the taxation and envy games seem to indicate that both eﬃciency and (to
a lesser extent) inequality aversion are important determinants of behavior. Now in
treatment R where both ERC and F&S predict the eﬃcient allocation A, only 26.7%
of the choices were in accordance, whereas 53.3% of the subjects chose C (pABC <. 08,
pAC >. 15) .I nc o n t r a s t ,i nt r e a t m e n tP ,w h e r eb o t hE R Ca n dF & Sp r e d i c ta l l o c a t i o n
C, 60% of the subjects chose the eﬃcient allocation A (pABC <. 001,p AC >. 18),i . e .
far more subjects chose the eﬃcient allocation when it is not minimizing inequality
compared to the case when it does (p<. 08). (The distribution of choices diﬀers
signiﬁcantly between R and P, χ2
2 =7 .23,p<. 03.)
In treatment R a choice of C is consistent with non-self centered inequality aversion
since the diﬀerence between persons 1 and 3 is minimal, although their average diﬀer-
ence to person 2 is maximal,14 with competitiveness, and some non-linear versions of
F&S. These motives, however, all predict allocation C in treatment P, as do F&S and
ERC, but only 33.3% chose this allocation. This implies that they do not provide an
explanation for the discrepancy.15
14In the questionnaires some subjects referred to a fair division of money between persons 1 and 3.
15The results in treatments P and R can be reconciled with competitiveness if subjects see themselves
in competition with the person whose payoﬀ is closest to the own. This implies minimizing the payoﬀ
diﬀerence to the second poorest person in treatment P (thus a choice A) and maximizing the diﬀerence
13We consider the crucial diﬀerence between treatments R and P to be the role of
maximin preferences. In treatment R the minimal payoﬀ is maximized in allocation
C,16 which was chosen by the majority of subjects, whereas in treatment P the minimal
payoﬀ is constant, so maximin preferences have no inﬂuence. Hence the comparison of
treatments R and P indicates that maximin preferences are important.
The results of treatment Ey that allows us to diﬀerentiate between eﬃciency and
all the fairness motives show roughly a tie between the eﬃcient allocation A (40%) and
the least eﬃcient, but supposedly fair allocation C (36.7%). These results are well in
line with treatment P, since the lower number of eﬃcient choices and the marginally
higher number of choices for C are consistent with a positive inﬂuence of maximin
preferences. From this comparison, though, this inﬂuence seems rather weak. Further-
more, maximin does worse in comparison to eﬃciency than in treatment R. A possible
explanation in addition to pure randomness (distributions are far from signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent, χ2
2 =1 .8,p > .4)i st h a tt h et r a d e - o ﬀ between eﬃciency and the minimal
payoﬀ is more favorable to maximin in R than in Ey. Thus the diﬀerence is consistent
with reasonable parameter distributions in the C&R model.
The fundamental diﬀerence between the treatments Ey and Ex is the ERC predic-
tion. The results are essentially identical, which indicates that ERC is irrelevant in
this context.17
Treatments Ey and P provide evidence against a primary importance of inequality
aversion in general form, not just the speciﬁc formulations of F&S and ERC. According
to the axiomatic characterization of F&S provided by Neilson (2002), a choice of C in
treatment R only contradicts a combination of inequality aversion and linearity.18 A
choice of A in treatments N, Ny, and Nyi contradicts a combination of inequality
aversion and positional asymmetry (which is reﬂected by the condition α ≥ β).I n
to the second richest person in treatment R (thus a choice C). None of the existing fairness theories
considers such a motivation.
16Nine of ten subjects who mentioned fairness chose C, while only two subjects explicitly indicated
maximin preferences.
17Since the number of choices for allocation C is even slightly lower in Ey than in Ex, the results sug-
gest a marginal negative inﬂuence of ERC. Randomness, however, seems a more plausible explanation,
since the distributions are far from signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (χ2
2 = .5,p>. 77).
18Note, however, that a choice of C in treatment R is only consistent with unrealistically extreme
forms of inequality aversion. Even if the disutility was cubic in the payoﬀ diﬀerence, B would still be
preferred over C. Hence R not only contradicts a combination of inequality aversion and linearity of
the utility function, but inequality aversion and anything but extreme concavity. Suﬃciently extreme
forms like disutility that is exponential in the payoﬀ diﬀerence have absurd implications, namely that
subjects who pay non-trivial amounts to reduce a small inequality, would pay almost inﬁnite amounts
to reduce a large inequality by just a bit, e.g. they would be willing to pay more than 2000 times as
much to reduce a payoﬀ diﬀerence from 16.1 to 16 than they would pay to reduce a payoﬀ diﬀerence
of 6 to 0. Hence it appears much more plausible, that instead of the magnitude of the inequality, the
relative position of the other players is more important, but this amounts to maximin preferences.
14contrast, in treatments P and Ey, a choice of A is inconsistent with the inequality
aversion property alone19 as well as with non-self centered inequality aversion and
ERC. In both treatments fewer subjects chose the allocation predicted by all versions
of inequality aversion than the eﬃcient allocation, although the former is also consistent
with competitiveness and in Ey even with maximin preferences, motives that appear
to be of substantial importance in games of this type.20
Treatment P also shows the limits of quasi-maximin preferences, since for any pos-
itive weight on eﬃciency quasi-maximin preferences imply a choice of A, which was
chosen by only 60% of the subjects. A third of the subjects instead seems to be guided
by either inequality aversion or by competitiveness.
4.4 Control Treatments for the Role Uncertainty
It is conceivable that the role uncertainty that subjects faced in the preceding treat-
ments might have enhanced their concerns for eﬃciency since they were clearly con-
fronted with the possibility to end up in any of the three roles and this might have
increased their concern for the well-being of the subjects in the other roles. It also
might have increased in particular the concern for the subject with the lowest payoﬀ
a n dh e n c ei n c r e a s e dt h er o l eo fm a x i m i np r e f e r e n c e s . 21 While we did not believe that
these potential eﬀects were substantial, we have conducted control treatments for Ex
and P without role uncertainty. We chose these treatments because we considered
treatments most informative where a substantial deviation in the direction of both
more and fewer eﬃcient choices would have been possible and because treatment P
had provided the clearest evidence against inequality aversion. Treatment P allows us
to study the isolated eﬀect on eﬃciency, treatment Ex possible eﬀects on both eﬃciency
and maximin preferences. In the control treatments, subjects knew in advance their
role. Only subjects in the role of person 2 were asked to choose an allocation and they
knew that their choice would be implemented. To generate 30 observations we hence
19The results in P would be consistent with inequality aversion if the utility function was highly
convex in the inequality, but this property is just the opposite of what is necessary to reconcile results
in R and the basic dictator game with inequality aversion. Choices for A in Ey are even inconsistent
with this form of inequality aversion.
20Charness and Grosskopf (2001) also study pure distribution experiments and they ﬁnd between
20% and 34% of subjects that appear to be driven by either inequality aversion or competitiveness.
About 10% can clearly be attributed to competitive preferences in a similar decision task, which leaves
only about 10 to 20% of the decisions indicating inequality aversion. Falk et al. (2000a) ﬁnd even
19% competitive subjects in a three-person prisoner’s dilemma and in an ultimatum game where the
responder always obtains the higher payoﬀ.
21On the other hand, the role uncertainty could also enhance the role of inequality aversion since
this method underlines that all players are a-priori in the same situation, so that no one deserves more
or less than the others.
15Treatment Ex Ex* P P*
Allocation ABCABCABCABC
Person 1 21 17 13 21 17 13 14 11 8 14 11 8
Person 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 444444
Person 3 345345567567
Total 36 33 30 36 33 30 23 21 19 23 21 19
Average 1, 3 12 10.5 9 12 10.5 9 9.5 8.5 7.5 9.5 8.5 7.5
Relative 2 .333 .364 .4 .333 .364 .4 .174 .19 .211 .174 .19 .211
Eﬃcient A A A A
ERC pred. A A C C
F&S pred. C C C C
Maximin C C A B or C A B or C
Choices (abs.) 1 251 3 1 031 7 18 2 10 1 531 2
Choices (%) 40 16.7 43.3 33.3 10 56.7 60 6.7 33.3 50 10 40
Table 4: Allocations (in DM), predictions by ERC and F&S, maximin and eﬃcient
allocations and decisions for treatments Ex, Ex*, P, and P*
needed 90 subjects in both control treatments, which we label Ex* and P*. Subjects in
the roles of persons 1 and 3 were asked how they would have chosen if they had been
assigned the role of person 2 and also about their expectation of the choice of person
2.
The details and predictions for Ex* are identical to those for Ex and those for P*
are identical to those for P, of course. The results are presented in Table 4. To ease
the comparison, we also repeat the results of treatments Ex and P.
Compared to the treatments with role uncertainty, in both treatments without role
uncertainty the number of choices for the eﬃcient allocation decreases by one sixth
(from 60% in P to 50% in P* and from 40% in Ex to 33.3% in Ex*). Although this
is in line with the hypothesis that role uncertainty favors eﬃciency, the diﬀerence is
small and far from signiﬁcant (Ex vs. Ex*: χ2
2 =1 .22,p>. 54, Pv s .P * :χ2
2 = .65,
p>. 72) and it can hence be attributed to random eﬀects. In treatment P* still more
subjects chose the eﬃcient allocation than the inequality minimizing allocation. Since
the diﬀerence between the original and the control treatments is virtually identical in
both treatments, there is also no indication that the role uncertainty increased the
focus on maximin preferences (if anything, the data point in the opposite direction).
Overall, the control treatments do not provide any indication that our results might
be primarily driven by the role uncertainty method we applied. Charness and Rabin
(2001) conducted control treatments for 11 games to test whether the role reversal they
employed in Charness and Rabin (forthcoming) has an eﬃciency or maximin enhancing
eﬀect. They do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant or substantial eﬀects either. Also Charness and
Grosskopf (2001) use role uncertainty in one of their studies, but not in the other. While
they do not use exactly the same games, the results do not indicate an important eﬀect
16of role uncertainty. Since these experiments are similar to ours, this further supports
that our results are not driven by the role uncertainty.
In both treatments, none of the distributions of expectations or hypothetical deci-
sions of either persons 1 or 3 diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the actual choices of persons 2
(χ2
2 < 3.1,p>. 21 for all pairwise comparisons).
5 The Relative Importance of the Diﬀerent Mo-
tives
In order to better understand the relative inﬂuences of the diﬀerent motives we pool the
data and estimate a conditional logit model (our situation is captured by Mc Fadden’s
choice model, see e.g. Maddala, 1983).
For every allocation j, j ∈ {A,B,C} that person i can choose from we deﬁne the

































Vij = γ1Effij + γ2MMij + γ3Selfij + γ4FSαij + γ5FSβij + γ6ERCij
Then according to the conditional logit model the probability that person i chooses






Since we only have one decision per subject, we cannot take into account any individ-
ual diﬀerences. Hence with this approach we estimate the preferences of an ‘average
subject’ and all heterogeneity is incorporated in the error.
Considering the α and β components of F&S separately has the advantage that
it allows us to investigate for both components individually whether they explain any
22We choose the negative of the inequality as measured by F&S and ERC because this implies that
estimating an odds ratio >1a m o u n t st oa ni n ﬂuence in line with F&S or ERC.
17of the variance. This, however, causes a collinearity problem because in all of our
treatments23







We follow two approaches to overcome this problem. In the ﬁrst approach we exclude
Self, because we are not primarily interested in the role of self-interest and, as shown
by runs including Self, it has a positive but insigniﬁcant inﬂuence. In the second
approach, we include a strict version of F&S, FSstrict = FSα+FSβ, that is we replace
the separate components by an aggregate measure of inequality, that assumes equal
weights assigned to disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. We also conducted
another run excluding MM.
We estimate the model on the basis of three diﬀerent sets of treatments. First we
use all treatments (except for the control treatments Ex* and P*, because they were
run with a diﬀerent procedure). In the second approach, we exclude treatments E
and F, because they are structurally identical to Ex and Fx and there were also more
subjects in these treatments, which biases the results in giving too much weight to
these treatments. Third, we exclude treatments E, F, and Ey, in order to only pool
data from treatments that were run in one session and hence under exactly identical
conditions. The results are reported in Table 5 along with the results of likelihood-ratio
tests of hypotheses that certain subsets of the motives are irrelevant.24
If we include both components of F&S separately we ﬁnd that both eﬃciency and
maximin preferences have a clear signiﬁcant inﬂuence and maximin more so than ef-
ﬁciency.25 In contrast, neither component of F&S has signiﬁcant impact, with the α
component having a positive impact and the β component a negative. This would
be consistent with some subjects wanting to reduce richer subjects’ payoﬀs, but the
motivation to increase poorer subjects’ payoﬀsi se n t i r e l yc a p t u r e db yt h em a x i m i n
motive. A positive eﬀect of the α component and a negative eﬀect of the β compo-
nent are consistent with competitive preferences. Competitiveness can be expressed
either as a combination of the α component and the inverse of the β component or
as a combination of selﬁshness and the inverse of eﬃciency. Since we cannot include
competitiveness in the model due to this collinearity, this implies that any decisions
that are in fact driven by competitiveness will lead to an increase of the coeﬃcient for
the α component and a decrease of the coeﬃcient for the β component in the ﬁrst test
(consistent with the results found). In the following tests such decisions will lead to a
decrease of the coeﬃcient for eﬃciency and an increase of the coeﬃcient for selﬁshness.
23Overcoming this problem would require including games with more than three players.
24We chose to report odds ratios instead of parameter estimates since they allow for an easier
interpretation. The odds ratio denotes the factor by which the odds (Pij/(1 −Pij)) are multiplied if
the corresponding independent variable increases by one unit.
25Note that the odds ratios are in general not directly comparable because the variables are partly
scaled in diﬀerent ways.
18All Treatments excluding E, F excluding E, F, and Ey
Odds Ratio sign. p Odds Ratio sign. p Odds Ratio sign p
γ1(Eff) 1.232 <.02 1.189 <.03 1.202 <.02
γ2(MM) 1.492 <.001 1.412 <.001 1.366 <.01
γ4(FSα) 1.245 >.16 1.136 >.39 1.119 >.44
γ5(FSβ) .816 >.28 .820 >.27 .820 >.27
γ6(ERC) .953 >.07 .955 >.08 .944 >.06
L-R γ4 = γ5 =0 >.31 >.47 >.50
L-R γ4 = γ5 = γ6 =0 >.10 >.11 >.09
γ1(Eff) 1.109 <.03 1.096 <.05 1.112 <.04
γ2(MM) 1.492 <.001 1.412 <.001 1.366 <.01
γ3(SELF) 1.373 >.14 1.277 >.23 1.263 >.25
γ4(FSstrict) 1.007 >.93 .965 >.70 .958 >.65
γ6(ERC) .953 >.07 .955 >.08 .944 >.06
L-R γ4 = γ6 =0 >.15 >.10 >.08
γ1(Eff) 1.286 <.001 1.250 <.001 1.258 <.001
γ3(SELF) 1.032 >.86 1.018 >.91 1.035 >.84
γ4(FSstrict) 1.351 <.001 1.239 <.001 1.143 >.05
γ6(ERC) .898 <.001 .910 <.001 .891 <.001
Table 5: Estimated odds ratios for the conditional logit model and results of likelihood-
ratio tests
The ERC motive has a negative, marginally signiﬁcant impact. Likelihood ratio
tests reveal that both F&S components together do not explain additional variance
(p>. 3) and that F&S and ERC jointly add only marginally to the explanation (p>
.09). (Note that if one considers this as indicating that they explain a signiﬁcant part
of the variance, their joint impact is negative.)
Including FSstrict and Self instead of the separate F&S components also yields
clear results. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive impacts of eﬃciency and maximin preferences,
virtual irrelevance of the F&S motive (this is not aﬀected if we use diﬀerent weights
for the α and β component) and a marginally signiﬁcant negative impact of the ERC
motive. A Likelihood ratio test again reveals that F&S and ERC jointly do not add
signiﬁcantly to the explained variance.
An important insight is provided by the last test. Here, we exclude the maximin
motive. Apart from a highly signiﬁcant positive impact of eﬃciency, we now also ﬁnd a
highly signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of FSstrict and a highly signiﬁcant negative impact of
the ERC motive. This means that if we ignore the maximin motive, F&S appears to be
a much better model of distributional preferences than ERC. But if we include maximin
preferences, this advantage virtually disappears. This provides a deeper understanding
why F&S clearly outperforms ERC in the taxation games, but does poorly in the
other games. The superior performance of F&S in the taxation games seems to result
from being in line with maximin there, but not from being a more accurate model
19of behavior in general. Note again, however, that it is not an artifact of our design
that F&S is rather in line with maximin than ERC, but a natural consequence of the
diﬀerent formulations.
As can be seen from Table 5, all results are remarkably robust to the exclusion of
treatments E and F and also the exclusion of Ey.
6 Discussion
Our results indicate that eﬃciency and maximin preferences are important motives
in simple distribution games, and that interpretations of experimental results in favor
of e.g. a particular form of inequality aversion might be confounded by them. This
problem could potentially extend beyond the class of games and the motives that we
study.26 In this section we discuss examples where the common interpretation of results
could be confounded, but also the limits of the explanatory power of eﬃciency concerns
and maximin preferences in these games. We also point out what might be a crucial
aspect of our experiments that could lead to an increased importance of eﬃciency
and maximin. Furthermore, we discuss other experiments that distinguish between
inequality aversion and other motives and that show additional short-comings of F&S
and ERC that our experiments were not designed to investigate.
In the gift-exchange game (Fehr et al., 1993, Fehr et al., 1997), concerns for eﬃ-
ciency are consistent with above equilibrium eﬀort levels of workers, as well as above
equilibrium wages in the original version of the game. They cannot, however, explain
important phenomena in the gift-exchange game like the positive relation between
wages and eﬀort or above equilibrium wages in the modiﬁed “weak reciprocity treat-
ment” in Fehr et al. (1997). In particular, workers hardly ever choose eﬀort levels that
make them worse oﬀ than the employer, although this would increase eﬃciency. Hence
there seems to be a fairness constraint that is rarely violated. The presence of such
a fairness constraint, however, does not necessarily imply that workers are motivated
by inequality aversion. Our experiments suggest an important role of eﬃciency and
maximin preferences. For the worker, eﬃciency concerns demand a maximal eﬀort,
selﬁshness demands a minimal eﬀort, but maximin demands an increase in eﬀort if the
employer is worse oﬀ and a decrease in eﬀort if the worker is worse oﬀ. If maximin
preferences plus eﬃciency concerns are stronger than selﬁshness, but selﬁshness plus
maximin are stronger than eﬃciency concerns, this implies an eﬀort level where em-
ployer and worker payoﬀs are equal. Hence the fairness constraint may result from
an interaction of selﬁshness, eﬃciency concerns and maximin preferences (i.e. quasi-
maximin preferences) as well as from inequality aversion. Put diﬀerently, in this situ-
ation the interaction of these motives can imply inequality minimization, so it is not
26Charness and Rabin (forthcoming) present a similar argument.
20possible to discern whether workers are motivated by inequality aversion, or whether
inequality minimizing actions result in this situation (but not necessarily others) from
other, underlying, motives. Therefore, it cannot be concluded from the experiments
whether the motive driving the above equilibrium wages is reciprocity (as claimed in
Fehr et al., 1993 and Fehr et al., 1997), inequality aversion (as claimed by Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999, and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or quasi-maximin preferences.
The gift-exchange experiments also point to another important issue, the distinction
between a reciprocity motive (or generally motives dependent on perceived intentions)
and motives based solely on the distribution. While the above mentioned experiments
do not allow this distinction, the experiments by Charness (2000, 2001) do. He com-
pares treatments in which the wage was determined by the employer, a chance event,
or a third party. He ﬁnds little evidence for positive reciprocity, but clear evidence
for negative reciprocity. Interestingly, he ﬁnds that for low wages, where the worker is
disadvantaged for any eﬀort levels, 0 out of 41 workers choose an above minimum eﬀort
in the employer treatment, whereas 11 out of 47 do so in the other treatments. Further-
more, in only 2 (out of 182 possible) cases in the employer treatment workers choose
the maximal eﬀort level when this leaves them with the lower payoﬀ, but in 10 (out
of 160 possible) cases in the random treatment.27 Hence the fairness constraint seems
to be partially driven by reciprocity. We will come back to this issue of distributional
m o t i v e sv e r s u si n t e n t i o n sb a s e dm o t i v e sb e l o w .
In the trust or investment game (Berg et al., 1995, Ortmann et al., 2000) ﬁrst
movers who send money to second movers could be motivated by trust or by eﬃciency
concerns, while due to the lack of eﬃciency gains, second movers returning money
(which they do only to a limited extent in the experiments) cannot be attributed
to eﬃciency concerns. In a similar experiment Van Huyck et al. (1995) show that the
investment increases with the achievable eﬃciency gains (so at least there is interaction
with eﬃciency). Again an important question is whether subjects act out of purely
distributional concerns or whether perceived intentions matter. Cox (2000) provides
an approach to distinguish between trust and reciprocity on the one hand and other
regarding preferences (i.e. distributional concerns) on the other hand. He compares
an investment game with the dictator games derived from a decomposition of the
investment games into the purely distributional decisions. He ﬁnds evidence for both
trust and reciprocity, but distributional concerns appear to be more important.28 That
63% of senders send money in the decomposed game, where receivers can’t send money
back is in sharp contrast to inequality aversion since both start with equal endowments,
27Eﬀort levels that leave the worker in disadvantage are much less frequent in the third party
treatment than in the random treatment. Hence it appears that workers also react with lower eﬀort
levels if they feel unfairly treated by a third party as opposed to after an unfavorable chance event.
28This is in line with a similar approach by Kritikos and Bolle (1999) who ﬁnd evidence for positive
reciprocity, but in contrast to results by Bolton et al. (1998), who do not ﬁnd evidence for reciprocity.
21but it is consistent with eﬃciency concerns. Indeed, since selﬁshness and maximin
preferences appear to be important motives in pure distribution games, but predict
nothing to be sent, this is rather strong evidence for eﬃciency concerns.
The moonlighting game (Abbink et al., 2000) extends the investment game by
allowing ﬁrst movers to take money from second movers and second movers to (costly)
punish ﬁrst movers. Falk et al. (2000b) compare second mover decisions in this game
and the degenerate game where ﬁrst mover choices were replaced by a chance move.
They ﬁnd that perceived intentions matter for both punishment and reward. But they
also ﬁnd that 5 out of 23 second movers “punish” chance moves that put them at
a disadvantage, in sharp contrast to eﬃciency concerns, but in line with inequality
aversion.29 This share is, however, also consistent with the 19% competitive subjects
identiﬁed in Falk et al. (2000a).
In the centipede game, passing, in particular at the last stage, where it cannot be
motivated by expectations of being rewarded, violates inequality aversion.30 McKelvey
and Palfrey (1992) ﬁnd shares of 15% (in a 6 move game) to 31% (in a 4 move game) of
pass decisions in the last stage. They classify players who always pass as altruists (and
estimate a 5% share of altruists), whereas one cannot distinguish between concerns for
eﬃciency (or maximin) and altruism in the centipede game. The striking aspect of the
centipede game appears to us the ineﬃciency of the Nash equilibrium, which suggests
that eﬃciency concerns are at least a very plausible explanation for deviations.
This points to another issue, the distinction between eﬃciency concerns and al-
truism. Altruism and eﬃciency concerns are diﬃcult to disentangle. The distinction
appears to be more on the level of the cognitive process. We would see the cognitive
focus of altruism to be the other individuals in the group and in particular their indi-
vidual well-being, whereas the cognitive focus of eﬃciency concerns is the whole group
and its well-being is represented by a single number, the total payoﬀ.A n i m p o r t a n t
implication of this diﬀerence is that a decision maker guided by eﬃciency concerns and
making a choice that yields a certain total payoﬀ to a group should not be inﬂuenced
by the size of this group, whereas he should choose a higher total payoﬀ if more people
are included if he is guided by altruism (and his utility function is concave in each other
person’s payoﬀ as it is commonly assumed in models of altruism). Thus a ﬁxed sacriﬁce
eﬀect as found by Selten and Ockenfels (1998), where subjects who win a lottery do-
nate the same total amount to two subjects not winning as to one subject not winning,
29Oﬀerman (forthcoming) also studies a game where the second mover can punish and reward both
helpful and hurtful choices by the ﬁrst mover. Comparing treatments with random and deliberate
choices by the ﬁrst mover, he ﬁnds that intentionality has only a mild, insigniﬁcant eﬀect on reactions
to helpful choices, but a dramatic eﬀect on reactions to hurtful choices.
30An exception would be extreme aversion towards advantageous inequality coupled with virtual
indiﬀerence towards disadvantageous inequality, which, however, appears to be nothing but a compli-
cated way to describe maximin preferences.
22cannot be reconciled with altruism but does not contradict eﬃciency concerns.31
Donations that do not increase eﬃciency as in the basic dictator game (e.g. Forsythe
et al., 1994) can be interpreted as evidence for altruism. They are, however, also
consistent with maximin preferences, which can be seen as a particular form of altruism
with an extremely limited focus. Kritikos and Bolle (1999) claim that altruism is an
important motive. They concede that an important determinant of altruism is the
intensity of eﬃciency gains. They do not, however, consider eﬃciency concerns as a
motive in itself. In Kritikos and Bolle (2001) they present results from dictator games
that are better in line with eﬃciency concerns than with inequality aversion. By stating
that “the norm to which altruistic players adhere is eﬃciency”, they equate altruism
with eﬃciency concerns.
In the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) the decision of the proposer does not di-
rectly aﬀect eﬃciency but an eﬃciency maximizing choice depends on his expectations
of the responder’s behavior. If the proposer assumes that the probability of acceptance
increases in the oﬀer (up to an equal split), he should oﬀer an equal split to maximize
expected eﬃciency. While it seems conceivable that rejections of unequal oﬀers are
driven by pure distributional concerns, in particular inequality aversion, experimental
results by Blount (1995) and Falk et al. (2000a) suggest that instead the driving force is
indeed negative reciprocity. In Blount’s (1995) experiments acceptance thresholds are
substantially lower if proposals in the ultimatum game are not made by the ﬁrst player
but by a random move and, dependent on the framing, they can also be signiﬁcantly
lower if the proposals are made by an independent third party.32 Falk et al. (2000a)
study ultimatum games with reduced choice sets. They ﬁnd that rejection rates for a
suggested (8-2) split are dramatically higher if the alternative available proposal was an
equal split (5-5) (44%) than when it was an even more unequal split (10-0) (9%) or the
proposer had no choice (he could “choose” between an (8-2) split and an (8-2) split)
(18%). Thus the responder’s perception of the proposer’s intentions are responsible
for a larger share of rejections than the payoﬀ inequality. The 18% of subjects who
reject the (8-2) proposal when the proposer had no choice could be seen as evidence
for inequality aversion. Falk et al. (2000a), however, also observe 19% rejections in an
ultimatum game where the rejection increases the payoﬀ advantage of the responder
and 19% of players in a three-person prisoner’s dilemma who defect and punish. Both
these results appear only consistent with competitiveness. Hence the 18% rejections in
31Since the size of the pie cannot be aﬀected, eﬃciency is simply not an issue here and does not
provide an explanation for the phenomenon, as inequality aversion does not either.
32Similarly to Charness (2001), the results for the third-party treatment are in between the interested
party and random treatments. It appears that subjects who get angry about proposals by the third
party, behave less cooperatively. This eﬀect is signiﬁcantly reduced if the second movers’ awareness of
their decisions’ eﬀect on ﬁrst movers is increased. Hence it appears that this anger is not intentionally
directed against the ﬁrst mover.
23the game where proposers had no choice do not indicate that any rejection has to be
attributed to inequality aversion.
Kagel et al. (1996) study ultimatum games where proposals are made in chips and
t h e s eh a v ed i ﬀerent values for proposers and responders. While pure eﬃciency concerns
would lead to an allocation of all chips to the player with the higher conversion rate,
the results tend towards the equal money split. Hence the equality constraint appears
to be important in this game as well, but as in the gift-exchange game, it can be
derived from maximin preferences and selﬁshness. There is also clear evidence for
selﬁshness, since proposers stick to an equal chip split if responders are unaware that
they have the lower conversion rate and thus receive a lower payoﬀ.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
perceived intentions are important because rejection rates are signiﬁcantly higher if it
is common knowledge that the proposers have the higher conversion rates and hence
that an equal chip proposal is to the advantage of the proposer than if this is only
known to the responder. Eﬃciency concerns appear to be dominated by a combination
of selﬁshness, maximin and intentions (and possibly inequality aversion). On the other
hand, they do not seem to be entirely irrelevant, because when conversion rates are
common knowledge, there are no proposals that give the higher money payoﬀ to the
responder when he has the lower conversion rate, but a substantial part of the proposals
(25% in the last two periods) give the higher money payoﬀ to the responder when he
has the higher conversion rate (and thus violating selﬁshness, maximin preferences,
and inequality aversion).
It seems that eﬃciency reducing behavior like rejections in the ultimatum game
are driven by the question whether there is an acceptable reason for what might be
perceived as an unfair allocation. A randomly generated proposal, the absence of a less
unequal alternative, and the proposer’s unawareness of the inequality of the proposal
appear to be acceptable reasons for the responder, whereas an unequal proposal con-
sciously made by the ﬁrst mover who could have made an equal proposal is not. While
the standard ultimatum game seems to be in favor of inequality aversion as opposed
to eﬃciency and maximin, considered together with Blount (1995), Kagel et al. (1996)
and Falk et al. (2000a) it is completely consistent with a model based on eﬃciency,
maximin preferences, selﬁshness, competitiveness, and perceived intentions.33 In con-
trast, the whole story is only consistent with a model based on inequality aversion,
selﬁshness, competitiveness and intentions if the role of inequality aversion is relatively
weak compared to intentions and competitiveness.
Kagel and Wolfe (2001) test implications of inequality aversion in variations of the
three-person ultimatum game by Güth and van Damme (1998). They vary the amount
33Of course, eﬃciency and maximin preferences cannot explain why proposals are rejected in the
ultimatum game (but maximin correctly predicts which proposals are more likely to be rejected). The
point is that what needs to be added, intentions and competitiveness, also have to be included in a
model based on inequality aversion to give a complete explanation.
24the third player receives in case the second player rejects. If rejections were motivated
by inequality aversion, they should sharply decline with that amount. The results
however, suggest at best an extremely weak relation in that direction. The results
in the second experiment in Kagel and Wolfe (2001) also cast some doubt on the
relevance of eﬃciency and in particular of maximin preferences. In this experiment the
third person actually loses money if the second mover rejects the proposal. Eﬃciency
and maximin imply that this should reduce the rejection rate, but it does so only
marginally. The authors interpret the inconsistence of their results with the inequality
aversion models as an indication that subjects perceive the reference group as diﬀerent
from what is assumed in the models or that they all (including C&R) fail to suﬃciently
take into account the importance of the role of intentions.
As the above examples show, not taking into account the important role of perceived
intentions is a serious short-coming of both ERC and F&S. It also limits the reach of
the basic C&R model. Falk and Fischbacher (1999) present a model that is based
on F&S but incorporates intentions. The full C&R model incorporates intentions in
a form the authors call concern withdrawal. We did not intend to study the role of
intentions, but in contrast designed potential inﬂuences of perceived intentions out of
our experiment to study the relative importance of diﬀerent distributional concerns in
a framework unconfounded by intentions.
It appears that there are three important questions that have to be addressed
if we want to understand social preferences. First, if only distributional preferences
matter, which are most important? Our experiments suggest that eﬃciency concerns
and maximin preferences are more important than inequality aversion in this case. The
experiments in Charness and Rabin (forthcoming, 2001), and Charness and Grosskopf
(2001) allow a comparison of diﬀerent distributional motives in games with little or
no interaction. Consistent with our results and the C&R model, they ﬁnd only little
evidence for inequality aversion, but substantial evidence for quasi-maximin preferences
(and some for competitiveness). Fehr and Schmidt (2001) review further evidence that
eﬃciency concerns are important in dictator game situations.
Second, it is important to understand the relative importance of perceived intentions
compared to distributional motives. This appears to depend on the game. While
the impact of perceived intentions seems to be of only minor magnitude, though still
signiﬁcant, in the investment game (Cox, 2000), it appears to be rather dramatic in the
ultimatum game (Blount, 1995, Falk et al., 2000a) and the moonlighting game (Falk
et al., 2000b).34 Fehr and Schmidt (2001) conclude that quasi-maximin preferences
34The hypothesis that intentions matter fails in Deck (2001). The implication is that second movers
would cooperate more in an exchange game (which is a simpliﬁed investment game) than in an
insurance game, that diﬀers by not allowing mutual proﬁts. The results are in the opposite direction.
Furthermore, cooperation is more frequent in the exchange game if it is played in normal form, contrary
to the prediction.
25and inequality aversion are more important than intentions for kind actions,35 whereas
intentions seems to play an important role for payoﬀ reducing behavior.36
The third question is more subtle and our experiments highlight its importance,
although they are not designed to answer it. The question is, whether interaction in
itself changes the relative importance of diﬀerent distributional motives. The results
in our and other pure distribution games imply an important role of eﬃciency and
maximin preferences and basically no importance of inequality aversion, which appears
to be at odds with some results in strategic games (e.g. Kagel et al., 1996). The, so far
open, question is whether this is exclusively due to the role of intentions or whether the
absence of strategic considerations shifts the focus to diﬀerent distributional concerns.37
The approach by Cox (2000) is in general a method to study this question, but in the
game he considers it is not possible to disentangle reciprocity from changes of the
distributional preferences due to interaction alone. The impunity treatment of the
ultimatum game (in case of an unfair oﬀer responders can only reject their own share)
studied by Bolton and Zwick (1995) yields some evidence. Proposers had the choice
b e t w e e na ne q u a la n do n eu n e q u a lo ﬀer (that diﬀered between periods). Except for
one equal oﬀer in the ﬁrst and the second period, all oﬀe r si na l lt e np e r i o d sw e r e
to the disadvantage of the responder. This is in contrast to positive oﬀers made in
the dictator game in Forsythe et al. (1994), so one might conclude that the pure fact,
that the responder had any choice at all changed the perception of the proposer of
the game to be more competitive and foster self-interest as opposed to other motives
like maximin preferences or inequality aversion. As Bolton and Zwick (1995) point
out, however, in their impunity treatment proposers were, due to the restricted choice
set, forced to give away at least 1/4 of the total pie over the periods and this is not
substantially diﬀerent from the average amounts sent in the dictator game. While this
is still in conﬂict with 21% proposers giving away at least an equal share in Forsythe et
al. (1994), this discrepancy appears too weak to draw clear conclusions, in particular
because there were only ten proposers in the impunity treatment. Charness and Rabin
(2001) call the eﬀe c tt h a ts e c o n dm o v e r sa r el e s sg e n e r o u sw h e nﬁrst movers had a
choice complicity eﬀect. The latter paper oﬀers evidence for this eﬀect in four simple
games. In these games, 22% of the second movers’ choices are favorable to ﬁrst movers.
This compares to 35% favorable choices in the corresponding dictator games obtained
by eliminating the ﬁrst mover’s choice. There are more favorable choices in all four
cases in the dictator games, although a ﬁrst mover choice of entry was favorable to
the second mover in three of the games (and neutral in the other). This eﬀect was
35Falk et al. (2000b), however, ﬁnd that intentions are also important for payoﬀ increasing behavior.
36This could again be interpreted that subjects care for eﬃciency, since they need a good reason to
reduce eﬃciency. An exception are the 10-20% competitive subjects consistently found who reduce
other’s payoﬀs independent of perceived intentions.
37See Fehr and Schmidt (2001) for a similar discussion.
26reversed when ﬁrst movers could express a preference over the second movers’ choices,
suggesting that preference expression per se is perceived to constitute a choice. Hence
it appears that subjects make more selﬁsh choices when they can attribute part of the
responsibility to the other player.38 There are fewer choices in line with inequality
aversion in the dictator version in two of the four games and more in one. Hence
the eﬀect on the relative importance of inequality aversion and quasi-maximin appears
unclear. Selﬁshness appears to be more important, all other motives less so.
Some further experiments allow a comparison of diﬀerent approaches to inequality
aversion and how they relate to eﬃciency concerns and maximin preferences. Bolton
and Ockenfels (1998) show that the results of three-person ultimatum experiments by
Güth and van Damme (1998) are well in line with ERC. On the other hand, violations
of the crucial properties that they show to be consistent with ERC require extreme
parameters in F&S, e.g. a rejection of a proposal of a third of the total pie for the
responder would require α+β > 2, which Fehr and Schmidt (1999) estimate to be the
case for only 10% of players in standard ultimatum games. Allocating a positive amount
to the third player requires β >
2
3 for the proposer, which does not occur according
to the parameter estimates of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and a rejection based on a
low payoﬀ for the third player requires even β > 2. Hence the results of Güth and
van Damme (1998) are only weak evidence against F&S. Riedl and Vyrastekova (2002)
study an ultimatum game with two responders who can both reject the proposal, and
vary the eﬀects of a rejection on the other responder. They ﬁnd only one out of 44
responders with a pattern consistent with ERC and even none consistent with F&S,
but 6 that are consistent with the basic C&R model (they do not apply the full C&R
model and the basic model produces identical predictions as selﬁshness). Frechette et
al. (2002) study the Baron-Ferejohn bargaining model of legislative behavior. They
ﬁnd that voting behavior to a large extent relies on the “fair share” as acceptance
threshold, consistent with ERC, but that there is also some evidence that shares just
below the “fair share” are more likely to be rejected if the overall distribution is more
unequal. Concerns for the minimal payoﬀ appear to be largely irrelevant. Proposals
become more biased in favor of the proposer over time. In one treatment equal split
proposals virtually disappear by period 13 (out of 25), in contrast to ERC, F&S, and
maximin preferences.
In a three-person prisoner’s dilemma game with punishment opportunities, Falk et
al. (2000a) interpret their results as favoring the F&S measure of inequality over the
ERC measure. This interpretation is problematic, however, since the F&S prediction
(punishment of defectors) is in line with the prediction based on intentionality, while
the ERC prediction (punishment of cooperators) exactly opposes it. As argued above,
38Charness (2000) discusses responsibility alleviation, a related eﬀect where subjects appear to be
more selﬁsh when they can attribute some of the responsibility to a third party, and reviews evidence.
27both theories are defective in ignoring intentions and so since F&S is in line with,
arguably more appropriate, intentions-based theories, the conclusion that F&S employs
the better measure of inequality may just be an artifact of the design.39 Güth et al.
(forthcoming) ﬁnd that concerns for eﬃciency are insuﬃcient to overcome an equal
payoﬀ fairness constraint in a dictator game. They ﬁnd, however, a substantial share
(6 of 21) of eﬃciency-guided subjects in a mutual gift-giving game, where a fairness
constraint depends on the expectation of the other player’s choices and is hence not
salient.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Bolton (1998) suggests three building blocks to explain behavior in games: motivation,
learning and strategic reasoning. In the present experiments we have completely iso-
lated distributional preferences from issues such as learning, intentions and strategic
reasoning, because distributions are given the central role in F&S and ERC. We are
thus able to provide a pure test both for the comparison of ERC and F&S and for
the relative importance of inequality aversion, eﬃciency and maximin preferences as
components of the motivation block. It turns out that inequality aversion does not
seem to be a major part in a complete explanation in this setting.
Both an analysis of the individual treatments and a conditional logit analysis of the
pooled data show that a combination of eﬃciency concerns, maximin preferences and
selﬁshness (which amounts to the basic C&R model) is virtually suﬃcient to explain
the data. F&S and ERC do not account for additional variance. In contrast, F&S and
ERC are not suﬃcient to explain our data. Both eﬃciency and maximin do account
for extra variance. This is consistent with results for similar simple distribution games
in Charness and Rabin (forthcoming) and Charness and Grosskopf (2001).40
39In addition they study one ultimatum game, where responders can destroy only 90% of the pie and
one where responders cannot reduce inequality. In the ﬁrst case, the rejection rate is 1/3 lower than in
the control treatment (standard ultimatum game), in the second case 2/3. They conclude from these
results, that the F&S inequality measure is a better explanation than the ERC measure. Punishment,
however, is much more eﬀective in the ﬁrst game than in the second, so that the diﬀerences between
treatments can also be explained by intention-based punishment if responders care about the relative
price of punishment.
40Our results are also consistent with the purely distributional model by Cox et al. (2002). This
model is based on altruism that is concave in the others’ payoﬀ and also assigns a higher weight to
subjects that receive a lower payoﬀ than those with a higher payoﬀ. This model diﬀers from C&R by
the non-linearity and that special attention is given not only to the lowest payoﬀ but to all payoﬀsl o w e r
than the own. In our experiments this model is consistent with all the choices that are consistent with
C&R, but also with ineﬃcient choices in the poor game. Our experiments, however, do not provide
a very good test of this model, because it is consistent with all choices in too many treatments. It is
only inconsistent with ineﬃcient choices in F, Fx, N, and Nx, of which we observe only very few. A
28The taxation games, which we consider the most neutral playground for the com-
parison of F&S and ERC, show a better performance of F&S than of ERC, but also an
important inﬂuence of eﬃciency. The rich and poor games very vividly illustrate that
maximin preferences have a major inﬂuence, and that eﬃciency matters more than
inequality. On the other hand they show as well that there are limits to quasi-maximin
preferences. The results in treatments P and Ey are of particular importance, because
they are inconsistent with general forms of inequality aversion and not just the speciﬁc
formulations of ERC and F&S. The comparison of treatments Ex and Ey also sug-
gests that ERC is largely irrelevant in this class of games. The envy games show that
inequality aversion does poorly when it yields predictions that are Pareto-dominated,
but also that even Pareto-dominance is not completely ruling out other motives like
inequality aversion or competitiveness.
Our analysis of the pooled data reveals that the superior performance of F&S over
ERC in the taxation games appears to be driven by the fact that F&S is in line with
maximin preferences. If maximin preferences are not included, than the probability
that an allocation is chosen increases signiﬁcantly if it is in line with F&S, but it does
not, if maximin is explicitly included. Hence the results cannot be interpreted in a way
that more subjects have F&S preferences than ERC preferences but that F&S takes
into account that subjects (other things being equal) care about the minimal payoﬀ in
the group. It appears as a limitation of ERC that it does not do so.
Our experiments highlight further limitations of F&S and ERC. Neither theory
takes account of eﬃciency concerns, nor do they explicitly consider intentions (a matter
that we deliberately designed out of our experiments). That the latter is a clear deﬁcit
is pointed out, for example, by the experiments of Blount (1995), Falk et al. (2000a,
2000b) and Kagel and Wolfe (2001). It seems to us, that in plain distribution situations
simple motives like eﬃciency concerns and maximin preferences guide subjects’ choices.
In strategic situations, however, perceived intentions come into play, and which motives
are most important may well depend on the structure of the game.
We concede that the degenerate games we study are of a special kind. Theories
of inequality aversion may work better in environments where strategic interaction,
perceived intentions and learning matter. Hence at the current stage, our results do
not discard inequality aversion as a motive in general. And, to clarify this, we do not
discard fairness motives. Of course, maximin is a fairness motive. Both F&S and ERC
are, however, exclusively formulated on the basis of distributions and interaction and
intentions should rather appear as confounding factors. We conclude, that theories
that are based on distributions should, in general, carefully clarify under which condi-
tions they are appropriate. Inequality aversion may do better in situations involving
similar model is studied by Andreoni and Miller (2002) and they show that it ﬁts the data of dictator
games well.
29perceived intentions, because in these games reciprocity may coincide with inequality
aversion and hence the latter may serve as a black box model of the former, as Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) suggest. This, however, may be an artifact of the classes of games that
have been the focus of experimental research so far (in particular those where a player
who treats another player unfairly has a higher payoﬀ, as in the ultimatum game).41
Our games can be considered special in three respects. First, in most treatments
the allocator’s payoﬀ is not aﬀected. Second, there is role uncertainty and this might
i n c r e a s et h er o l eo fe ﬃciency concerns and maximin preferences. Third, there is no
strategic interaction.
Concerning the ﬁrst issue, our treatments Nx, Ny, and Nyi show no signiﬁcant
(and in particular no unexpected) impact of small deviations of the allocator’s payoﬀ
over the allocations. Hence they provide no indication that the existence of monetary
incentives changes the relative importance of inequality aversion, eﬃciency and max-
imin preferences. Therefore, our results cannot be attributed to the constancy of the
decision maker’s payoﬀ alone. While large incentives would most likely change the de-
cisions, we do not see why they should change the relative importance of the diﬀerent
motives.
As to the role uncertainty, our control treatments do not provide an indication that
this method has a substantial eﬀect and we can at least clearly refute the claim that
our results are entirely driven by this method. This conclusion is supported by the
results of Charness and Rabin (2001) and Charness and Grosskopf (2001).
The remaining issue is the absence of strategic interaction in our experiments. It is
conceivable, that apartfrommatters like reciprocity the fact alonethatthere is strategic
interaction might possibly change the importance of diﬀerent distributional motives.
Since it is diﬃcult to disentangle this possible eﬀect from the eﬀects of perceived
intentions, to the best of our knowledge there is yet no persuasive evidence on this
matter. It is a matter of substantial importance, because if the relative importance
of diﬀerent distributional preferences depends on the presence and the nature of the
strategic interaction, then the whole approach to test distributional preferences in one
strategic situation to understand the results in another, appears to be problematic.
There are, however, also important situations, which may well not be perceived as
strategic interaction, and for these our results are thus more directly applicable. An
example would be voting in large groups.
The eﬀect that the games we study are essentially non-strategic might be moderated
by the role uncertainty we employed in the experiments. Although a subject’s decision
will only be relevant when chosen as the allocator and there is no outcome of the
random group formation process that has two subjects aﬀecting each other, at the
time of the decision the subjects are all in a symmetric situation and make choices
41See Charness and Rabin (forthcoming) for a similar discussion.
30that can aﬀect the others. Hence at that time subjects might perceive the situation as
interactive since they mutually inﬂuence their expected payoﬀs.
As long as there is no conclusive evidence that the relevance of our results is en-
tirely conﬁned to non-interactive situations, they also have some general implications.
Given the importance of eﬃciency concerns and maximin preferences, we believe that
in interpreting experimental results one should keep these motives in mind as alterna-
tive explanations. They are consistent with many results that are readily interpreted
as evidence for diﬀerent kinds of fairness concerns. Deviations from pure selﬁshness
have been interpreted that subjects are better people (i.e. more altruistic or fair), but
maybe they are just better economists. It is surprising that for economists the goal
in designing economic mechanisms is to maximize eﬃciency, while as experimentalists,
when designing economic experiments, they tend to ignore that subjects might share
this goal.
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34A Instructions
[These are sample instructions for treatment Fx (subtreatment Fx1). The instructions
for all other treatments were parallel, except for that in treatments F and E the person
with the lowest payoﬀ was called person 1 and that with the highest payoﬀ person 3.
Subjects in the control treatments P* and Ex* were assigned roles in advance and
received correspondingly adjusted instructions.]
Instructions [page 1]
Thank you for participating in our experiment. With low eﬀort you will earn between
1.- DM and 19.- DM. Please read these instructions carefully. If there is anything that
you do not understand, please raise your hand. An experimenter will then come to you
and clarify the problem.
Your tasks in this experiment consist of a simple decision in the ﬁr s tp a r ta n dt h e
completion of the questionnaire in the second part.
Part 1:
Together with two other participants whom we randomly select, you will
form a group. You will not get to know anything concerning the identity of
these other participants. In the same way, others cannot identify you and
your decisions.
As for the formation of the groups, we will later randomly assign you one
of three roles (person 1, person 2 or person 3).
On the decision sheet (see next page), you will ﬁnd three possible payment
columns (A, B, C). Person 2 will decide, which of the three payment columns
will be realized for all three group members.
Your Task:
On the decision sheet choose that payment column which you as person 2
prefer for the group and mark it with a cross.
Later on we will collect the decision sheets and will randomly assign the
roles of person 1, 2, and 3 among you and the other group members. To
determine the payments in your group, the decision of person 2 will be
applied. In case you are assigned the role of person 1 or person 3, your
decision will thus be irrelevant. In case you are assigned the role of person
2, however, the column that you have selected will determine the payments
of all three persons in your group.
35Part 2:
Your Task:
Please complete the accompanying questionnaire.
Thanks again for your participation in this experiment. Please detach now this ﬁrst
page with the instructions and your participant number. It is your proof of participa-
tion. The payment will take place in cash next week following the lecture. If you are
not present then, you can collect your payment until [...] in oﬃce [...]
Keep the sheet with your participant number and bring it along for the payment.
Without it we cannot pay you any money.
Decision Sheet [page 2]
Please mark the column that you prefer in case you get assigned the role of person 2.
Payment column A B C
P e r s o n1 1 9D M 1 8D M 1 7D M
P e r s o n2 1 0D M 1 0D M 1 0D M
Person 3 1 DM 5 DM 9 DM
Your Decision ¤¤¤
Average 1 and 3 10 DM 11.50 DM 13 DM
Total 1,2,3 30 DM 33 DM 36 DM
We would appreciate it if you stated a reason for your decision.
[Part 2 (pages 3 and 4) consisted of questions concerning biographical data and the
personality questionnaire developed by Brandstätter (1988)].
36